Committed. The working tree is clean and all checks pass.

Delivered (commit 5fa9be1 on main):

• src/LaunchToken.sol: Gradients (GRAD), fixed-supply ERC-20, no constructor arguments, 10^27 minor units minted to the deployer, no mint or admin paths.
• src/GradientNFT.sol: ERC-721 "Gradients" / "GRADIENT", 1,000-token cap with sequential ids, 10,000 GRAD per token burned to the dead address by one safeTransferFrom, quantity 1 to 10, no owner, no payable, receive or fallback. Counter and payment settle before _safeMint. tokenURI is fully on-chain JSON plus SVG derived from keccak256 of the id only.
• Tests in test/: 47 tests across unit, fuzz and invariant suites. They cover every case the workflow lists: byte-identical tokenURI decoding to JSON with the SVG, unminted ids reverting, quantities 0 and 11, quantity 10 at 995 minted, minting exactly to 1,000 then one more, exact dead-address gains, zero GRAD and ETH balances, missing allowance, and re-entrant receivers unable to exceed the cap or mint unpaid.
• docs/abi/LaunchToken.json, docs/abi/GradientNFT.json, and docs/ABI.md for the interface.
• README.md documenting parameters, assumptions, the deploy shape for the manifest node (constructorArgs ["$token"], no owner), operational responsibilities, and the note that mint order decides art.
• lib/: forge-std 1.9.7 and OpenZeppelin 5.1.0 vendored as plain files, no submodules.

Verification results

Notes for the reviewer and manifest node

• The application takes exactly one address argument, the GRAD token. There is no privileged role anywhere, so no $owner argument is needed.
• GRAD pushed directly to the NFT contract by a plain transfer is stuck by design, since adding a sweep would introduce a role the workflow excludes. This is documented in the README rather than mitigated.
• The Deploy.s.sol script is a local anvil helper only, tested directly. The Sepolia launch goes through the ProjectFactory.

Added 10 adversarial fuzz tests, strengthened invariants, and a reentrant receiver covering mint order, payment/cap failures, and rollback.

forge build and forge test pass: 60 tests, zero failures.

Reported two unresolved zero-custody conflicts in .imd-findings.json: unsolicited GRAD and forced ETH can remain in GradientNFT. Reproducible failing probes are included under test/.

Created launch.json with GRAD metadata, GradientNFT(["$token"]), and native-ETH pool settings.

Validation passed against the supplied schema and compiled constructor ABIs. forge build succeeded; all 60 tests passed.

Only launch.json changed.

Recorded one low-severity finding in .imd-findings.json.

• Stuck funds — confirmed: GRAD.transfer(nft, 1) permanently strands one minor unit. Deploying a helper funded with one wei whose constructor executes selfdestruct(payable(nft)) strands ETH despite ordinary transfers reverting. Both balances remain after a successful mint. This violates the unconditional zero-balance requirement, without disrupting minting.
• Reentrancy — attacks fail: At supply 990, mint(10) followed by callback mint(1) rejects the nested mint. With funds covering only the outer mint, nested payment fails; insufficient nested allowance also reverts. Late receiver rejection rolls back both outer and nested payments.
• Price overflow — attack fails: Quantities type(uint256).max and type(uint256).max / PRICE + 1 revert with InvalidQuantity before multiplication.
• JSON/SVG injection — attack fails: Interpolated values contain only decimal or lowercase hexadecimal digits. All 1,000 minted token URIs decoded correctly, matched independent art calculations, and repeated identically.

Manifest confirmed: GradientNFT’s ["$token"] matches its single nonpayable address constructor. LaunchToken takes no arguments. Neither grants privileged roles, including roles the factory cannot exercise. Both exported ABIs match compiled source.

Verified through local EVM probes. Reviewed source, tests, manifest, and configuration remain unchanged.

Implemented the frontend and static export in dist/.

Build, typecheck, all 11 browser tests, and ABI/manifest checks pass. Candidate submission bundle: 2.34 MB.

Evidence: docs/FRONTEND_VALIDATION.md. Design documentation: docs/DESIGN.md, respecting the allowed paths.

Commit blocked: .git is read-only; files remain in the working tree. Live RPC verification remains unconfirmed because all endpoints returned HTTP 403.