I've written the RAFL token and the CommitRevealRaffle contract, with tests, ABI exports and a README. forge build, all 47 of my tests and forge fmt --check pass offline. I also ran the two protected test files against the real deployment code, predicting the factory addresses: all 8 pass (6 token, 2 project).

What's in the repo

• foundry.toml: solc 0.8.26, bytecode_hash = "none", no ffi, no filesystem access.
• lib/forge-std v1.9.7, copied in as plain files (no submodule, no nested .git).
• src/RaffleToken.sol: "Raffle" (RAFL), 18 decimals, no constructor arguments. It mints exactly 10^27 units to the deployer. There is no owner, mint, burn, pause or upgrade path.
• src/CommitRevealRaffle.sol: its only constructor argument is the token address ($token), and it reverts if that address has no code. There is no owner, admin or fee. The only external calls go to the token, every action has a reentrancy lock, and every state change emits an event. How a round works:
  • Buying: the first purchase starts a round. Sales are open for 1 day, a ticket costs 100 RAFL, and a round holds at most 500 tickets. Each ticket carries keccak256(secret); a commitment can't be zero or repeat within a round.
  • Reveal: for the next day, only a ticket's buyer can reveal its secret.
  • Settle: after that, anyone can call settle, which also opens the next round. The winning index is keccak(XOR of revealed secrets) % ticketsSold. If it lands on an unrevealed ticket, it moves forward (wrapping) to the next revealed one. If nobody revealed, the pot carries into the next round.
  • Claim: the winner calls claim to take the whole pot, with no deadline.
• test/: tests for the token, the raffle, and fake tokens that return false, return nothing, or call back into the raffle during a transfer. They cover:
  • wrong amounts: not enough allowance or balance, and sending ETH;
  • callers who aren't the ticket owner or the winner;
  • exact timing boundaries for buying, revealing and settling;
  • duplicate and double actions, and a full round;
  • the winner rule, including forfeits and wrap-around, and the carry-over when nobody reveals;
  • a fuzz test that no funds are created or lost, a test that settling a full round stays under 3M gas, and blocked reentrant calls into buyTicket, settle, reveal and claim.
• docs/abi/RaffleToken.json and docs/abi/CommitRevealRaffle.json.
• README.md: the rules, parameters, deployment values for the manifest step (CommitRevealRaffle with ["$token"], no $owner, the pool settings, Sepolia 11155111), who has to do what, and the known limitations.

Design choices the independent review should look at (all written up in the README):

• Randomness can be nudged. Commit-reveal isn't unbiased: the last person to reveal can check the result both ways and withhold, giving up that ticket. XOR makes the order of reveals irrelevant, so it adds no further choices.
• Skipped tickets favour their neighbours. Moving forward past unrevealed tickets means a revealed ticket right after a run of them wins more often.
• No refunds. This is deliberate, so people who don't reveal can't leave for free. If a round has no reveals and nobody ever buys again, the carried-over pot stays in the contract.
• Gas figure is an estimate. The gas test runs with warm storage, so a real worst-case settlement would cost more. I estimate about 1.1–1.3M gas, but that number isn't measured.

launch.json and the website are separate assignments, so I didn't write them. Nothing is committed yet.

Created .imd-findings.json with one high-severity, concretely reproducible finding. No implementation files were changed.

I reproduced the finding and fixed it. settle() now hashes all revealed secrets in ticket order instead of an XOR of them. forge build succeeds and forge test passes all 48 tests. I did not run forge fmt --check separately; I ran forge fmt before the build.

• Contract: reveal() now stores each secret per ticket in a private mapping, so the public ABI and docs/abi are unchanged. settle() concatenates the revealed secrets in ticket order and takes keccak256 of that. It writes the hash to round.entropy and takes it modulo ticketsSold. The forfeit-forward rule for unrevealed tickets is unchanged.
• Behaviour change: round.entropy is now 0 until the round is settled, where before it updated on every reveal.
• Tests: I added test_winnerIsKeccakOfAllSecretsNotXor, the reviewer's scenario with secrets 1 and 2. It expects Alice to win where the old XOR rule picked Bob. The existing tests that reproduced the XOR rule now check the approved rule.
• Docs: the README no longer describes XOR.

The response for the finding is in .imd-responses.json.

The prior high-severity finding is fixed. The exact reproduction passes, and the full suite passes all 48 tests.

Wrote .imd-findings.json with no remaining findings.

Created launch.json matching the accepted RaffleToken and CommitRevealRaffle implementations.

Verification:

• JSON structure and values validated
• forge build passed
• forge test passed: 48 tests
• No other files changed

No tracked file was modified. Findings are in .imd-findings.json.

What I checked

Built and ran the delivered suite offline (48/48 pass), confirmed docs/abi/*.json byte-matches forge inspect <C> abi --json for both contracts, and confirmed launch.json validates against the canonical LaunchManifest schema — kind, token block (RaffleToken/Raffle/RAFL/18, no constructor args), one contract CommitRevealRaffle with constructorArgs: ["$token"] filling its only address argument, no reserved name, no $owner needed because the contract has no owner parameter, pool 0x0…0/3000/60/79228162514264337593543950336. No manifest finding.

Then I ran my own adversarial probes against the unmodified contracts (in a scratch copy, since I write nothing here):

• Solvency across rounds — 256 fuzz runs × 10 rounds with no-reveal rollovers, random reveal masks and interleaved late claims. balance == Σ unclaimed pots + current round pot held at every step and every leftover winner stayed payable. No accounting bug.
• Reentrancy, hostile tokens, CEI — the lock and the token-call-last ordering are correct; the delivered tests already cover buy/claim/settle/reveal re-entry.
• settle round sequencing — settle never checks roundId == currentRoundId, but settle(0), settle(3) and re-settling all revert; rounds cannot be skipped.
• Token — self-transfer is a no-op (the classic stale-balance bug is avoided by write ordering), no mint path, runtime has no DELEGATECALL/CALLCODE/SELFDESTRUCT under the floor's PUSH-skipping scan; raffle runtime is 4,951 bytes.
• Assembly in settle — memory-safe; keccak256(all) is exactly abi.encodePacked of the revealed secrets in ticket order, matching the brief.

Findings (6, ranked)

1. medium — a k-ticket holder revealing last enumerates 2^k subsets of his own tickets off-chain and reveals only the one that names himself; forfeited stakes stay in the pot he collects, so it is cost-free. Measured: 3-of-10 wins 86% of rounds vs 30% fair; a scripted 4-of-10 run took a 1000 RAFL pot with a 400 RAFL stake. The mechanism is what the brief mandates and README.md:88 discloses it in general terms, so I did not mark it high — the contract change would be a redesign and is the brief owner's call. What is concretely wrong now is the disclosure: neither the README nor the launch.json notes state the magnitude or that the attack is free, and admission reviews economics from those statements.
2. low — claim() never zeros Round.pot (src/CommitRevealRaffle.sol:215). After a paid claim getRound(1).pot still reads 100e18 with a zero balance. No double-spend, but the website this stage feeds reads exactly that field. test_claimPaysPot asserts balances and claimed, never pot.
3. low — commitment front-running: copying a pending buyTicket commitment reverts the victim with CommitmentAlreadyUsed. The README's rationale for the uniqueness check is also wrong — reveal is already buyer-gated, so the check prevents nothing while creating this vector.
4. low — README.md:80 states balance always equals the pots; a direct RAFL transfer to the raffle breaks that and is permanently unrecoverable (verified: 1000e18 still stuck after a full round and claim). The no-sweep design is right; the invariant wording is not.
5. info — cold-storage worst-case settle is 1,490,360 gas, not the documented "1.1–1.3M"; test_settleGasBoundedForFullRound measures warm storage (needs vm.cool). Its < 3M bound still holds.
6. info — no test asserts multi-round solvency with rollovers and several unclaimed pots outstanding; testFuzz_conservation only plays round 1. I wrote and ran that test — it passes, so it is a coverage gap with no bug behind it, but it is the one property whose absence would hide a loss of funds.

Nothing I found justifies sending the implementation back to be redone: the core accounting, permissions, CEI and reentran