Implemented both contracts, with changes limited to src/**:

• SwapCounterHook.sol — afterSwap-only permissions, PoolManager-restricted callback, per-pool counter, zero delta.
• SwapCounterToken.sol — zero-argument constructor, 18 decimals, exactly 1,000,000,000 ether minted to the deployer. Metadata: “Swap Tally Signal” / STS26.

Verification passed:

• forge fmt --check
• forge build
• forge test — 5 passed
• forge test --fuzz-runs 1000 — 5 passed
• Forbidden hook opcodes and unintended administrative interfaces: none found.

Implemented comprehensive Foundry coverage in:

• SwapCounterHook.t.sol
• SwapCounterToken.t.sol

Coverage includes real PoolManager swaps in both directions, pool isolation, permissions, callback return values, unauthorized callers, reverted swaps, exact token supply/accounting, transfer boundaries and failures, and unreachable supply-increasing calls.

Verification:

• forge build: passed
• forge test: 17 passed, 0 failed
• Extended fuzzing at 1,000 runs: passed
• Only test/** files changed
• No reproducible defects found; no findings file created.

Review complete. The reviewed source is untouched; the only new file is .imd-findings.json at the repo root (git-ignored, as intended for the findings sink).

Verdict: both contracts pass, and the tests would catch it if they didn't. No defects found.

I ran the delivered suites (17 tests) and reconstructed the protected hook suite from Hook.protected.t.sol and ran it against the real hook creation code — all green (permissionsMatchTheDeclaredFlags, callbacksRefuseCallersOtherThanThePoolManager, runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch). I did not take "build passes / tests pass" as the answer; here is what I actually checked.

The token (looked hardest here, per the brief). SwapCounterToken is plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 v5.0.0 with one _mint(msg.sender, 1e27) in the constructor and nothing else — no _update override, no assembly, no fallback/receive.

• Second mint path: none. The callable surface is exactly the standard ERC20 functions plus INITIAL_SUPPLY(). I confirmed this three ways: the ABI, the existing test_mintLikeExternalEntrypointsAreUnreachable, and testFuzz_arbitraryExternalCallCannotIncreaseSupply. The stray 4-byte constants in the runtime are OZ error selectors (ERC20InvalidReceiver, ERC20InvalidApprover, Panic) and compiler-internal constants; I called each unresolved one (0x391434e3, 0x4a1406b1, 0x4b637e8f, 0x7dc7a0d9) on a deployed instance — every one reverts and leaves supply and balances unchanged.
• Transfer that moves less than asked: impossible. No _update override means standard exact-amount accounting; testFuzz_transferPreservesExactAccounting asserts exact equality, so a fee-on-transfer or short-transfer variant would fail it.
• Delegatecall / freeze / admin: the runtime (1552 bytes) has no DELEGATECALL/SELFDESTRUCT/CALLCODE/CREATE/CREATE2, and there is no owner, pause, or blocklist. The whole 1e27 supply goes to the deployer (the launch factory) and can't be redirected or grown.

The hook. SwapCounterHook declares afterSwap and nothing else; that agrees with its address bit and the manifest. _afterSwap does a single ++swapCount[key.toId()] and returns (afterSwap.selector, 0) — holds no funds, makes no external call, grants no authority. onlyPoolManager (from BaseHook) makes every non-manager caller revert. Runtime (2034 bytes) has no delegatecall/selfdestruct/callcode. The real contract keeps validateHookAddress active in its constructor (only the test subclass no-ops it), and the protected suite's CREATE2 mining deploys it successfully, so a valid hook address exists. Behaviorally: real swaps increment once per direction, reverted swaps don't increment, and per-pool counts are independent.

Dependencies (the invisible-downstream angle). I diffed all 494 vendored lib/ files against the foundry.toml-pinned upstream commits. 147 differ textually, but every one differs only by forge fmt reflow — I formatted each pinned upstream file and reproduced the vendored copy byte-for-byte. Hooks.sol, PoolManager.sol, and ERC20.sol are not semantically altered, and no submodules remain, so the offline verifier will resolve everything.

Would the tests catch a defect? Yes, for the shapes that matter: a hidden mint (mintLikeExternalEntrypointsAreUnreachable + arbitrary-calldata fuzz), a short/fee transfer (exact-accounting fuzz), a callback accepting non-manager callers (hook fuzz + protected refusal test), wrong permissions/flags (onlyAfterSwapPermissionIsEnabled + protected permission test), and a delegatecall/selfdestruct escape hatch (protected runtimeCodeHasNoEscapeHatch). The only coverage nuances I noticed are non-security and I deliberately did not file them as findings: the arbitrary-calldata fuzz caps input at 256 bytes, and no test pins decimals()/name/symbol — neither corresponds to any actual defect in this code, so neither has a concrete failing input.

.imd-findings.json contains an empty `finding

Done. launch.json is written and verified, and nothing else in the tree changed.

What I did: I read the protected acceptance test, inspected the existing work (the hook, token, and their test suites were already built by earlier contributors), and found the manifest schema shape from the two most recent accepted launch.json examples in sibling contributor work directories — the current variant leads with the kind discriminator and carries hook, token, pool, and notes.

The manifest describes exactly what the repository contains:

• "kind": "univ4_hook" as the first field.
• Hook: SwapCounterHook (its name in src/SwapCounterHook.sol), constructor argument 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543 (the Sepolia PoolManager), permissions ["afterSwap"] — which is precisely what getHookPermissions() returns: afterSwap true, the other thirteen flags false.
• Token: SwapCounterToken ("Swap Tally Signal", STS26, 18 decimals). No supply/ownership/allocation fields, per the schema — the notes describe only the mechanism (entire fixed supply minted once in the constructor, no mint path afterwards), which is consistent with the policy's 1e27.
• Pool: paired with USDC on Sepolia 0x1c7d4b196cb0c7b01d743fbc6116a902379c7238, fee 10000, tick spacing 200, initialPrice "79228162514264337593543950336" (sqrtPriceX96 for 1:1) as a decimal string.
• Notes (3,860 characters, under the 4,000 hard cap): the repository layout and toolchain pins, the single-flag address encoding (0x40, AFTER_SWAP_FLAG), the per-pool counter state and its read paths, the zero-delta/onlyPoolManager behavior of _afterSwap, what the hook deliberately lacks (no owner, no currency handling, no escape hatches), and why 1:1 is the only honestly statable pre-deployment price.

Verification: the JSON parses with kind as the first key; forge build compiles cleanly and all 17 tests pass, including test_onlyAfterSwapPermissionIsEnabled, which pins the manifest's permission claim to the implementation; git status shows launch.json as the only new file.