Implemented SwornToken: 1 billion SWORN, 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer.

Dependencies are vendored; README documents assumptions, deployment parameters, and operations.

Validation passed:

• forge build
• forge test: 31 tests, using the supplied fuzz seed
• forge fmt --check

Done. I wrote launch.json for the swornbyswarm (SWORN) custom token launch. It is the only new or changed file in the tree.

What the manifest says

• Kind is custom_token. The token contract is SwornToken with name swornbyswarm, symbol SWORN and 18 decimals.
• Constructor arguments are an empty list. The accepted constructor takes no parameters, which the compiled ABI confirms.
• Total supply is the constructor's single mint to msg.sender, one billion tokens in minor units, written as a decimal string.
• The contracts list is empty. The accepted tree ships no application contracts, so none are named.
• Pool and economics are copied exactly as the launch gives them: IMD pair address, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one provenance price, and the requester's verbatim economics object.
• Notes describe the token's fixed supply, lack of privileged functions and exact transfers, at 721 characters.

Verification

• A schema sanity check passed: only the six allowed top-level keys, supply equals 10^27, economics matches the job's object byte for byte, and names fit the length limits.
• forge build compiled cleanly with Solidity 0.8.26.
• forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed passed all 31 tests across 3 suites.
• git status shows launch.json as the sole untracked addition. No other file was touched.

I found no defects in the token's control flow. The only finding is an info-level provenance issue in test tooling. Results are in .imd-findings.json: 1 finding and 7 coverage rows, including all 3 listed entry points. No repository file was changed, and I removed the out/, cache/ and test/scratch/ directories my runs created.

What was reviewed: src/SwornToken.sol is a 17-line contract built on OpenZeppelin's standard ERC20 v5.4.0, unmodified. It has no constructor arguments, no owner, no fees, no overrides and no external calls, and its only mint is in the constructor. The compiled ABI exposes only the standard ERC-20 functions plus the INITIAL_SUPPLY constant.

Coverage, using the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides:

• transfer: holds. It rejects the zero address as recipient and checks the balance before debiting, which makes the unchecked subtraction safe. It moves exactly the requested amount. Sending to yourself or sending zero leaves balances unchanged.
• transferFrom: holds. The allowance is spent before the transfer, but if the transfer fails the whole call reverts and nothing changes; I tested this directly. An unlimited (type(uint256).max) allowance is never decreased, as intended. A zero-value call with no allowance moves nothing.
• approve: holds. It replaces the existing allowance and rejects the zero address as spender. The usual ERC-20 risk when changing an allowance is documented in the README, so I did not count it as a defect.
• Supply and launch flows: hold. Total supply stays at exactly 10^27 base units (1 billion tokens with 18 decimals). Every launch transfer arrives in full because there is no fee or burn. Sending ETH and calling a mint function both revert.
• Vendored OpenZeppelin files: hold. I downloaded the upstream v5.4.0 release and all six files used are byte-identical to it.

Finding 1 (info), dependencies.json:26: seven vendored forge-std files don't match the SHA-256 hashes recorded in dependencies.json. Example: StdAssertions.sol is recorded as d4c89eec… but hashes to 3fbf4a02…. I diffed them against upstream forge-std v1.9.7 and every difference is whitespace from forge fmt being run over lib/. This contradicts the README's statement that "Upstream library source is kept unchanged." It only affects test tooling and the provenance records, not the deployed token. The fix is to restore those files from the archive (or update the hashes) and exclude lib/ from formatting.

Checks run: the repo's 31 tests all pass, including the invariant test with 8,192 random calls, and forge fmt --check passes. Six extra edge-case tests of my own also passed: transferring to yourself, a failed transfer leaving no partial changes, unlimited allowance, zero-value transfers, ETH and mint calls being rejected, and supply staying constant under fuzzing.

Not run: the two supplied protected checks need IMD's separate launch harness, which isn't in this tree. Slither and Mythril weren't run. Aderyn's "large numeric literal" warning on line 12 is just the supply constant, which is correct (10^27), so I didn't report it.

Review complete. No defects found in the SwornToken permission model, and the findings file is written with an empty findings list and a full coverage record.

What the code is. src/SwornToken.sol is a 17-line contract that inherits OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 unchanged and mints one billion tokens with 18 decimals to the constructor's caller. The compiled ABI exposes only approve, transfer and transferFrom as state-changing functions. There is no owner, role, modifier, initializer, proxy, receive, fallback, delegatecall or selfdestruct.

What I checked against the Access Control, Asymmetry and Trust Gap guides:

• Access control: no privileged surface exists to misguard or escalate. The only trust assumption is that the constructor's caller, the launch factory, receives the whole supply, which is the requested design.
• Asymmetry: the approve and transferFrom pair write the same allowance slot in mirror directions. transfer and transferFrom share one update path, so no caller class, including the deployer, gets a different formula or skipped check.
• Trust gap: no economics, pricing or caller-dependent branch exists in the token, so launch flows to the distributor, pool manager and traders all move exact amounts.
• Supply chain: the vendored OpenZeppelin files hash-match the pins in dependencies.json, so no inherited path was tampered with.
• Static analysis leads: slither reported nothing. The aderyn large-literal note is the supply constant, which I confirmed equals 10^27 base units.

Verification run. The project builds cleanly on Solidity 0.8.26, and all 31 tests pass, including the 512-run fuzz tests and a 128-run by 64-depth invariant suite with zero reverts.

Not reported on purpose. The ERC-20 approve front-running race is a property of the standard the brief asked for, is documented in the README, and is not a defect of this code.

The deliverable is .imd-findings.json at the repository root with zero findings and six coverage rows, one for each of the three listed entry points plus three invariant rows. No other file was changed.

The review is complete. No defects were found in the assigned area, and the findings file reports a clean result with full coverage.

Outcome. The token in src/SwornToken.sol is an unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC-20 with a single constructor mint of 10^27 base units to the deployer. Nothing in it touches value flows, prices, fees, or allocations, so the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap failure modes have no code to attach to.

What I verified.

• All three entry points (approve, transfer, transferFrom) trace to the stock OpenZeppelin paths: zero-address rejection, atomic reverts, exact amount movement, unchanged total supply.
• The compiled ABI exposes exactly ten selectors with no mint, burn, fallback or receive, so supply cannot change after construction from any caller.
• The five vendored OpenZeppelin files hash identically to the files fetched from the upstream v5.4.0 tag and to the pins in dependencies.json. The lib tree holds nothing extra.
• An opcode scan of the compiled runtime using the protected test's reachability rule finds no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.
• The repository's 31 tests pass with the README's fuzz seed, including the invariant suite over 8192 calls with zero reverts. Formatting check passes.
• Launch flows (swarm share, claims, single-sided seed, buy and sell) all reduce to plain transfers that deliver exactly the requested amount. The README's economics values agree with this launch's own.

Leads dismissed. The aderyn large-numeric-literal line at src/SwornToken.sol:12 is the intended 10^27 supply constant. The standard ERC-20 allowance-replacement race is inherent to the brief's requested behaviour and already documented in the README, so it is noted in coverage but not reported as a defect.

Not reached. A live Uniswap v4 PoolManager seed and swap could not be executed here because v4-core and the harness's LaunchLiquidity source are not in this tree. Only the token side of those flows was exercised, which for a vanilla ERC-20 is the whole of what the token contributes.

The output is .imd-findings.json at the repository root with an empty findings list and twelve coverage rows. No repository files were changed.

The review is complete. The findings file is in place and the working tree has no other changes, since the findings file is excluded by the repository's own git configuration and my scratch tests are removed.

Result: no defects found in the assigned area. The file .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and seven coverage rows, one for each of the three listed entry points plus the constructor and three invariants.

What the token is. SwornToken is a 17-line contract that inherits the unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 and mints a constant supply to the deployer in its constructor. The vendored ERC20 file's hash matches the one recorded in dependencies.json. The compiled ABI exposes only the three standard state-changing functions.

What I checked against the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides.

• Supply constant. The literal flagged by aderyn is a compile-time constant equal to exactly 10^27, well inside uint256. The single checked addition in the mint cannot overflow. A CREATE2 probe confirms the supply lands on the immediate deployer, which is the factory in the launch, not the factory's caller.
• Transfer arithmetic. The inherited update path has one checked comparison and three unchecked operations. Each is safe because the sum of balances always equals the fixed supply. I confirmed with concrete values that transferring one over the balance, the full balance, exactly type(uint256).max, one wei, zero, and to self all behave exactly with no wrap.
• Allowance boundary. Only an allowance of exactly type(uint256).max is left undecremented. An allowance of max minus one decrements normally. An allowance one short of the amount reverts and leaves the allowance intact. An allowance above the balance is still bounded by the balance check.
• Launch splits. The 10, 70 and 20 percent shares and the swarm's 2 and 8 percent of 10^27 divide with zero remainder, and the token has no division, fee or rounding at all, so every launch flow moves exactly what it requests.
• Boundary enumeration. There are no external calls, no payable, receive or fallback functions, no bytes decoding, no sentinel-address branches and no downcasts, so the Boundary guide's call-site list is empty by construction. Sending ether or an unknown selector reverts.
• Numerical seams. With no formulas there is nothing for precision, boundary and invariant to combine on. A 512-run fuzz over three holders plus the project's own stateful invariant kept the balance sum exact.

Verification runs. The project's 31 tests pass. My 19 scratch tests, written under test/scratch and now deleted, all pass against the current code. Slither and aderyn reported nothing at low impact or above.

Outside my area, briefly. The contract has no owner, pause, blacklist, mint or burn entry point, so there are no trust assumptions to document. The static-analysis lead was style only and is not reported as a finding.

Added 20 tests under test/ covering failure paths, allowance boundaries, fuzz properties, and ledger invariants across 32,768 random calls.

forge build and all 51 tests pass with the required seed. No reproducible defects found. Existing files and configuration remain unchanged.

The review is complete and the findings file is written and valid.

Outcome: one finding kept, at info severity, and no defects in the token itself.

• Token code holds. src/SwornToken.sol is a 17-line, unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC-20 with a parameterless constructor that mints the manifest supply once to the factory. The vendored OpenZeppelin sources hash exactly to their recorded upstream digests. All three entry points, approve, transfer and transferFrom, are the stock implementations, so every launch flow moves exactly what it says and no privileged path exists. Build passes, all 51 project tests pass, and bytecode sizes are far under the deployment limits.
• Kept, merged from the flow specialist (info): seven vendored forge-std files do not match the per-file digests in dependencies.json, contradicting the README's "kept unchanged" claim. I reproduced it by hashing the tree and by downloading the recorded archive, whose checksum matches. The differences are whitespace-only line wrapping from forge fmt, and they affect test tooling only, never deployed code.
• Dropped: the aderyn large-numeric-literal lead. The literal evaluates to exactly the manifest supply at compile time.
• Manifest check: launch.json uses only schema keys, lists empty constructor arguments matching the constructor, states the exact minted supply, and has lowercase addresses.

The coverage record answers all three listed entry points as holds, plus three invariant rows. No proof test was needed since nothing is high or critical, and no files other than .imd-findings.json were changed.