The deliverable is complete and committed on main as a Foundry project at the repository root.

What was built

• src/SwornToken.sol: contract SwornToken, an OpenZeppelin v5.1.0 ERC20 with name swornbyswarm, symbol SWORN, 18 decimals. The constructor takes no arguments and mints the whole 1,000,000,000 token supply once to msg.sender, which is the factory at launch. There is no owner, mint path, pause, blocklist, tax, burn hook, selfdestruct or delegatecall. The X and website links from the brief are exposed as on-chain string constants.
• script/DeploySwornToken.s.sol: reference deploy script. Its deploy() function is what the tests call; run() reads no environment variables.
• test/SwornToken.t.sol: 27 tests covering metadata and supply, launch flows arriving whole (10% distributor, 70% pool, 20% requester, then a claim), transfer and allowance success paths, revert paths with exact OpenZeppelin error selectors, 22 common privileged selectors rejected from both a stranger and the deployer, ether rejection, an EIP-170 and opcode scan of the runtime, and three fuzz tests.
• README.md: layout, build steps, test coverage, manifest values, assumptions, operational responsibilities, and an empty "After launch" section since nothing is owner-settable.
• foundry.toml pins solc = "0.8.26", sets bytecode_hash = "none" and cbor_metadata = false, optimizer on, no ffi or filesystem access. Dependencies are vendored as ordinary files under lib/ with no submodules: forge-std v1.9.7 sources and the five OpenZeppelin files the token needs.

Verification

Forge was not installed on this machine, so I downloaded Foundry 1.5.1 stable into the scratch area and ran everything with it.

Check	Result
forge build (clean, solc 0.8.26)	success, no warnings
forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed	27 passed, 0 failed
forge fmt --check	clean
Compiled runtime	no CBOR metadata marker, 4.6 KB

Notes

• Slither was not available here and was not run. The design avoids all six rejected detectors by construction.
• The commit was made with an inline author identity since the repository has none configured and .git/ is off limits.
• launch.json was deliberately not written; the manifest values are listed in the README for the manifest step.

I found no defects in SWORN's permissions. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and a coverage row for each of the three entry points.

What's in scope: src/SwornToken.sol is OpenZeppelin v5.1's standard ERC-20 with nothing changed. It adds only constants, a decimals() override that returns 18, and a constructor that mints 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 tokens once, to msg.sender (the factory).

Access control: No owner role, admin role or modifiers exist. Nothing outside the constructor can create or destroy tokens. There is no pause, blocklist, freeze, seize or burnFrom, and no delegatecall, callcode or selfdestruct.

Trust gap and asymmetry: The constructor gives the deployer only the token balance. Once it has paid that out, the deployer can do nothing an ordinary holder can't, so there is no privileged path to bypass.

Entry points (all three holds):

• approve: sets an allowance only with the caller as owner, and reverts if the owner or spender is the zero address.
• transfer: moves exactly the amount from the caller's own balance, and reverts if the balance is too low or the recipient is the zero address.
• transferFrom: checks and reduces the spender's allowance first (a maximum allowance is never reduced), then moves exactly the amount.

There's no fee or burn on transfer, so the factory, PoolManager and distributor flows arrive in full.

Leads and checks: Aderyn's low-severity "large numeric literal" lead at line 28 is just the supply constant (1e27, correct), so it isn't a defect. Slither reported nothing. The project's existing test suite passes (27/27). I wrote no proof tests because there were no high or critical findings.

Not covered: I didn't review launch.json because there isn't one yet; the manifest step writes it later.

Created launch.json matching SwornToken, its exact supply, empty constructor arguments, and the required pool settings and economics.

Validation passed: manifest checks, forge build, and all 27 tests with the specified fuzz seed. Only launch.json is included in the changes.

The review is complete. The findings file holds an empty list with full coverage, and the tree is otherwise unchanged (.imd-findings.json is ignored by git, so status is clean).

Result: no defects in the Math Precision, Boundary or Numerical Gap area.

The SWORN token in src/SwornToken.sol is OpenZeppelin ERC20 v5.1.0 with name, symbol, decimals and supply fixed as constants and a single constructor mint. There is no custom arithmetic to leak value through.

What I checked, against each guide's failure modes:

• Math Precision. No division, downcast, shift, or scale conversion exists anywhere in the token or its inherited path. The supply constant evaluates exactly to 1e27 at compile time with checked arithmetic. Both unchecked blocks in OpenZeppelin's balance update and allowance spend are preceded by the strict guards that make them safe, and the balance sum is bounded by a supply far below the uint256 limit.
• Boundary. The contract makes no external calls, has no payable, receive or fallback function, and decodes no bytes. I confirmed that empty calls and unknown selectors revert, that max-uint and supply-plus-one transfers revert with the exact ERC-6093 error, that a zero-address from in transferFrom reverts even at value zero, and that the max-uint allowance sentinel is skipped while max-minus-one is decremented.
• Numerical Gap. The sum-of-balances invariant held across 2,000 fuzzed chains of random transfers including zero and dust amounts, and full-balance self-transfers via both transfer and transferFrom leave the balance intact. The launch's 10/70/20 split of 1e27 divides with no remainder, so no rounding reaches the distributor, pool seed or requester.

The one static-analysis lead, aderyn's large numeric literal at line 28, is a style note only and was not reported.

Coverage rows were written for all three entry points as holds, plus rows for the supply and launch-flow invariants, the boundary enumeration and the static lead. The scratch test I used was deleted, as nothing in that directory is kept.

The review is complete. The findings file holds an empty findings list and a thirteen-row coverage record, and the working tree is otherwise unchanged.

Result: no defects in the economics area. SwornToken is OpenZeppelin's ERC20 v5.1.0 with constants and a single constructor mint. Every failure mode the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap guides list needs a fee, hook, external call, owner, or secondary mint or burn path, and this contract has none of them.

What I verified, by reading and by executing tests:

• Supply invariants. The constructor mints exactly 1e27 units to its caller and nothing can change totalSupply afterwards. The compiled ABI exposes only approve, transfer and transferFrom as state-changing functions. Mint, burn and burnFrom selectors revert for both a stranger and the deployer.
• Conservation. A fuzz test over random transfer sequences among seven actors kept the sum of balances equal to totalSupply in every run.
• Launch flows. The swarm share, pool seed, requester remainder and a distributor claim each arrive whole with this job's split. Pulling through approve plus transferFrom, the way the pool manager settles, also moves exactly the requested amount and clears the allowance.
• External dependencies. The contract makes no external calls, has no receive or fallback, no payable function, no sentinel address branch and no owner. There is no dependency whose failure could strand or redirect value.
• Dependency integrity. All five vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to upstream v5.1.0 by sha256.
• Static analysis leads. Slither reported nothing. The aderyn large-literal note points at the intended supply constant and is not a defect.

Two things worth noting for the judge. The approve function has the standard ERC-20 approve-race property, which is inherent to the interface and documented in the README, so I did not report it as a defect. No launch.json exists yet, so that row is marked unreached. The README's intended manifest values match the code: empty constructor arguments, supply of 1e27, 18 decimals, contract name SwornToken.

The project's own 27 tests pass, and my scratch invariant tests passed before I removed them.

Added edge-case, failure-path, fuzz, and stateful invariant tests under test/.

forge build and forge test pass with the supplied seed: 51 reported tests and 32,768 invariant calls. No implementation defects found; production code and configuration unchanged.

The review is complete. No defects were found, and the findings file records that with full coverage.

Outcome: .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and seven coverage rows, one for each of the three listed entry points plus the constructor and supply invariant, the vendored library, the absent receive and fallback, and the one aderyn lead. All three entry points are marked holds.

What I checked, by guide:

• Execution Trace. Traced approve, transfer and transferFrom through OpenZeppelin's _approve, _spendAllowance and _update. Every path either moves exactly the requested amount or reverts atomically. Zero-address sender and receiver, zero amounts, self-transfer, max allowance and whole-supply moves all behave as the standard specifies. There are no external calls, hooks, fees or stale reads.
• Periphery. The vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to upstream v5.1.0, confirmed by diffing against the tagged sources. The unchecked blocks are each guarded by a preceding check or bounded by the fixed supply.
• First Principles. The constructor mints the whole supply to the caller once. A CREATE2 deployment from a factory contract leaves the full balance at the factory, which is what the protected launch test requires. Nothing after construction can call a mint path, so supply cannot grow. The decimals override is a pure constant that matches the stated supply.

Verification run:

• The project's own 27 tests pass, including the privilege-surface, bytecode-scan and fuzz tests.
• A scratch suite of nine edge-case tests I wrote under test/scratch/ passed and was then removed, so the tree is unchanged.
• forge fmt --check is clean.

Leads dismissed: the aderyn large-numeric-literal note on line 28 is a compile-time constant equal to one billion times ten to the eighteenth, asserted by the tests. The classic ERC-20 approve race is standard behaviour the README documents, not a defect in this code.

Not covered: nothing in my area was left unreached. Launch-manifest fields, pool pricing and the deployer's economics are outside the token and were not reviewed beyond confirming the token needs no exemptions because it has no transfer tax.

The review is complete. No defects were found, and the findings file holds an empty list with a full coverage record.

What was reviewed. The token is a single contract, SwornToken, which inherits OpenZeppelin ERC20 and adds only constants, a constructor that mints the whole supply to msg.sender, and a decimals override. The three entry points the verifier listed are the unmodified OpenZeppelin implementations.

How each claim was checked:

• All five specialist reports (math, permissions, economics, flow, tests) listed no findings, so there was nothing to reproduce or merge.
• The vendored OpenZeppelin files were diffed against upstream v5.1.0 and are byte-identical, so the inherited approve, transfer and transferFrom behave exactly as published.
• The project suite of 51 tests passed, including invariants over 256 runs and the privilege-surface selectors.
• A scratch test I wrote deployed the token with CREATE2 from a probe contract and confirmed the probe received the full supply, that overdraft, zero-address and missing-allowance paths revert with the expected errors, that infinite allowance is not decremented, and that ether sends and a mint call fail. It passed and was removed.
• Runtime and creation code are far under the EIP-170 and EIP-3860 limits, so the factory can deploy it.
• The manifest uses only schema keys, has empty constructorArgs matching the argument-free constructor, a totalSupply string equal to the minted amount, lowercase addresses, and notes under the limit.
• The one aderyn low lead, the large numeric literal on line 28, is the documented supply expression and evaluates to exactly the manifest supply. It is not a defect and was not reported.

Result. The findings file contains zero findings and seven coverage rows: the three entry points marked holds, plus rows for the mint invariant, the no-privilege invariant, the manifest, and the static-analysis leads. The working tree is unchanged apart from the findings file.