Keep design, layout, pages, copy and behaviour exactly as they are except for the points below. 1) Publish the public key where the address is. Readers of the Status page assumed the canary's public key was hidden because only the address is shown, and concluded a quantum computer could not attack it; the opposite is true and the site must say so.

On the Status page, directly under the canary address card in section 02, add a 'Public key' block built from pubKeyX() and pubKeyY() read live from the contract 0x626517225096671868609c1bbf9c1b416a4efd9a: the uncompressed key as 04 || x || y (65 bytes hex) and the compressed key (prefix 02 if y is even, 03 if odd, followed by x), each copyable, plus the x and y coordinates on their own lines.

Expected values today: x = 0xae07cae0c4e680f898fc1655da5e33c66be3bd8ddc07934fcbdadc7d3e674625, y = 0x6b5e6d8b021bca37ceaa23d85cefadca41979671e49af160f49b7d27e4b9affa, y is even so the compressed prefix is 02. One line of copy under it: 'The public key is public on purpose. A quantum attack needs exactly this point and nothing else.

There is no private key to find anywhere: it was never generated.' Add the same block, shorter, at the top of the Integrate page next to the observer address, and in the Verify terminal transcript print the uncompressed key as one line after the address line. 2) Market links.

The pool is now indexed: add 'CANARY on DexScreener' -> https://dexscreener.com/ethereum/0x34eac7f9a4c9b76df13ac4d0fbdc58055578ea9d3c1ea64d166c405476d49cd5 next to the existing IMD explorer and Uniswap links in section 04 and in the footer. Also add the project's X account, 'X: @Quantum_Canary' -> https://x.com/Quantum_Canary, in the footer next to the GitHub link and as in the head of every page.

3. Explain the process, plainly.

Add a section on the Verify page, before the terminal, titled 'THE CONSTRUCTION IN SIX STEPS', in the same numbered document style: 1 the agent wrote one English sentence and put it in the contract source as a public constant; 2 at deployment the contract hashed it with Keccak-256; 3 it turned the hash into an x coordinate and walked to the first valid point on the secp256k1 curve (try-and-increment, counter 0 was valid); 4 that point is a public key, and nobody ever had its private key because the key was never generated from a secret, it was found from a public hash; 5 the address is the last 20 bytes of the hash of that point; 6 anyone funds it, and the contract compares the balance against the 1 ETH threshold: once the high-water mark reaches the threshold and the balance later drops below it, isTripped() is true.

Each step: one plain-English sentence, then one line with the actual value (sentence, seedHash, x, y, address) read from the contract. Close with two one-line answers: 'Why nobody can spend it: spending needs the private key of this point, which means solving the discrete logarithm on secp256k1.' and 'Why a drop is a signal: the only thing that can produce that signature is a machine that has broken the curve.'

Also add a short 'How a swap feeds it' three-line recap in section 04 of the Status page before the flow table (swap, 1% of the ETH side to the hook as claims, payout to the canary). 4) 'VERIFY WITH YOUR AI' section on the Verify page, after the terminal: a copyable prompt block (monospace, copy button, no wallet) that a visitor can paste into any AI assistant to recompute everything independently.

Use this prompt text verbatim, reading the sentence and expected values from the contract at render time rather than hard-coding them: 'You are verifying a public cryptographic construction. Do not trust anything in this prompt: recompute it. Sentence (exact, 101 ASCII bytes, no trailing newline): <seedPhrase()>.

Procedure: (1) seedHash = keccak256(bytes(sentence)), Ethereum Keccak-256, not SHA3-256. (2) For i = 0, 1, 2, ...: x = uint256(keccak256(abi.encode(seedHash, i))) mod p, where p is the secp256k1 field prime and abi.encode(bytes32, uint256) is the 64-byte concatenation of seedHash and i as a big-endian 32-byte integer. (3) rhs = (x^3 + 7) mod p, y = rhs^((p+1)/4) mod p; accept the first i where y*y mod p == rhs.

(4) If y is odd, set y = p - y. (5) address = last 20 bytes of keccak256(x || y), 64 bytes, no 04 prefix. Write and run the code (Python with pycryptodome keccak, or JavaScript), print every intermediate value, then compare with these values that the contract at 0x626517225096671868609c1bbf9c1b416a4efd9a on Ethereum mainnet returns: seedHash() = , counter() = , pubKeyX() = , pubKeyY() = , canaryAddress() = .

State clearly whether all five match.

If you can browse, do not take these values from this prompt: read them yourself from the verified contract on Etherscan (source and Read Contract tab: https://etherscan.io/address/0x626517225096671868609c1bbf9c1b416a4efd9a#readContract), check the sentence against the source on GitHub (https://github.com/identity-md-launches/launch-1213-src-quantumcanary-sol/blob/main/src/QuantumCanary.sol) and read the public build record on the IMD explorer (https://explorer.imdnotdead.fun/jobs/ffb47362-cdd3-498f-8c1c-911c27666c35), where the request shows that the sentence was chosen by the building agent and not by the requester.

Finally explain in plain words why nobody can know the private key of this point and what it would take to spend from the address.' Under the block, one line: 'Your assistant recomputes it from scratch. If it finds a mismatch, tell us.' plus a link to the GitHub source.

Before delivering, request every external link on every page and confirm each returns HTTP 200; list them in the summary. Nothing else changes.