CONCEPT: Nailed Down Rug (NAILED)

Facts cited as [Sn] are listed with URLs in RESEARCH.md. Lines marked INFERENCE are my reasoning; lines marked ASSUMPTION are modelling inputs, not observations.

The idea in one paragraph

Base remembers its first big memecoin lesson: the dev pulled the liquidity two days after launch [S13][S15]. Nailed Down Rug (NAILED) is the rug that cannot be pulled, and it says so with a hammer. Every trade pays a fee; the fee buys a nail; a nail is a new liquidity position owned by a vault that has no function to send liquidity to any person. The more people trade the rug, the more nails go into the floor, in more pools, against more assets that do not move together, so arbitrage between the pools trades the rug again and buys more nails. Holders do not get paid; they get to swing the hammer: one public onchain call that pushes the waiting budget into the floor and puts their address on the Nail Board.

The problem it solves for Base traders and holders, and why now

• Problem: most Base memecoins have one thin pool whose liquidity belongs to whoever deployed it. Thousands of coins a day are launched by bots and by posts [S2][S3][S9][S11]; each has the same single exit, and that exit can be removed (the 2023 case [S13][S15]). Traders cannot see who controls the liquidity, and fee income from their trades leaves the coin.
• What NAILED changes: the trading fee that would normally go to the launcher is routed to a vault whose only actions are add liquidity, move liquidity between whitelisted pools by fixed rules, and buy NAILED to send to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD. Every balance is public. The coin's liquidity grows with use instead of depending on one wallet.
• Why now: Uniswap v4 hooks are live on Base [S17] and can take a per-swap fee and run logic in the swap path [S18]; Base has native USDC, EURC and cbBTC to pair against [S19][S20][S22]; and the coin-per-post and bot-launch wave [S2][S9] has made "where is the liquidity and who can pull it" the question every Base trader asks. INFERENCE: a coin whose joke is the answer to that question has a reason to exist this year that it did not have before hooks and native RWAs on Base.

Value for IMD and its swarm

• The swarm has so far launched only a test counter contract on Base (brief). NAILED is a complete, small, auditable system (token, vault, hook, vote) built and launched by the swarm: a public proof of work it can point to.
• The swarm receives 10 percent of supply at launch (fixed fact); its incentive is aligned with the vault working for years, not with a launch-day spike, because the swarm cannot pull the liquidity either.
• Every rule is a contract parameter, so the later build job has an exact spec (decisions D1 to D7 below), which is the kind of work the swarm is meant to do well.
• No income is promised to IMD, the swarm or anyone else.

Why it lands with the Base community

• It touches the oldest pain (the pulled-liquidity rug [S13]) and turns it into a running gag rather than a lecture.
• It mocks habits, not people: coin-per-post [S1][S2], bots deploying thousands of coins [S9][S11], farming a maybe-airdrop (the Nail Board is openly worthless points, and says so), "insider" buys (here the insider is a contract and its trades are in the explorer).
• The ritual is physical and screenshotable: you hammered nail #4 812 into the rug.
• It is self-aware: "this is still a memecoin; the floor is the only thing we nailed down".

The unique offer

A memecoin whose launch-side fee income can only become liquidity or a public buyback-and- send-to-dead, across several uncorrelated pools, run by a hook and a vault with no withdraw- to-person path, and whose community ritual is a single public function call. No tax, no mint, no income promise.

Three concepts and their score table

• A. Nailed Down Rug (NAILED): the rug that cannot be pulled; every trade buys a nail.
• B. Pre-Announcement (PRECAST): a coin that ranks who bought before the official post; joke on insider buys before announcements.
• C. Repost Coin (REPOST): a coin of a coin of a post; every vault pool is a "repost"; joke on coin-per-post.

Scores 1 (weak) to 5 (strong).

Criterion	A NAILED	B PRECAST	C REPOST
Flywheel is the punchline (trade -> nail -> floor)	5	2	3
Fits one picture, 3-second read	5	3	3
Onchain screenshot ritual	5 (hammer call)	3 (rank screenshot)	3 (repost a pool)
Sarcastic, self-aware about Base habits	4	5	4
Avoids banned tropes and mocking people	5	2 (rewards front-running; points at real "insiders")	4
Diagram of the loop is honest and simple	5	3	3
Works as a 32 px icon	5 (rug + nails)	3	2 (text-like)
Abuse resistance of the player mechanic	4	2 (it literally rewards being early by any means)	3
Total (of 40)	38	23	25

Why B lost: its joke celebrates the behaviour it mocks, its player mechanic rewards front-running, and it drifts toward pointing at real people. Why C lost: it is a joke about the content-coin wave that the content-coin wave already tells about itself, and its pools-as- reposts metaphor needs a paragraph; it does not read in three seconds.

The chosen flywheel (12 steps)

1. Someone buys or sells NAILED in any pool that uses the NAILED hook.
2. The pool charges its fee; in the launch NAILED/ETH pool that is 1.25 percent, of which 1 percent (80 percent of the fee) goes to the launching side and 0.25 percent to the network (fixed facts). The launching side's 1 percent is paid to the vault.
3. The hook adds its own fee of 0.25 percent on every swap in every NAILED pool it serves and pays it to the vault. Budget = launch-side 1 percent + hook 0.25 percent.
4. The hook records Nail Points for the trader (rules in "Players"). Points are public, non-transferable, not a token, and redeemable for nothing.
5. The vault holds the budget in a Liquidity Bucket (in ETH).
6. When the bucket holds at least the pool-open threshold (2 500 USD equivalent, read from the ETH/USDC price of the vault's own USDC pool or a fixed ETH amount until it exists) and no pool was opened in the last 7 days, the vault opens the next pool chosen by the pair vote; otherwise it deepens existing pools pro rata to their weekly volume.
7. Opening and deepening are single-sided ranges of the paired asset (USDC, EURC, cbBTC, or ETH in the launch pool) placed just below the current NAILED price: the vault buys the pair asset with ETH and posts it as standing liquidity. It never needs to buy NAILED to add liquidity.
8. NAILED now trades in several pools whose other side moves independently (USD, EUR, BTC, ETH). When BTC or EUR moves against ETH, prices diverge; arbitrageurs trade NAILED between pools, which is volume (back to step 1) with no new outside money needed.
9. The vault's positions earn LP fees (vault pools use a 0.50 percent LP fee). Those fees are the Rewards and never leave the vault.
10. Rewards split: 50 percent Buyback, 50 percent back to the Liquidity Bucket.
11. Buyback: the hook, inside a later swap's afterSwap, spends the buyback balance in small slices on NAILED in the deepest pool and transfers what it gets to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD, emitting a public event.
12. Anyone can call hammer() on the vault: it runs steps 6, 7, 10 and 11 now instead of waiting for the next swap, and writes the caller onto the Nail Board as nail #n. The loop never depends on this call; it is the ritual.

The loop as one diagram

             +-----------------------------------------------+
             |                                               |
             v                                               |
   [ TRADE in any NAILED pool ] --(a)--> [ POOL FEE 1.25% / LP fee ]
             |                                   |
             |(b) hook 0.25%                     |(a) launch side 1% -> vault
             v                                   v
        [ VAULT: Liquidity Bucket ] <-----(f)----+
             |
             |(c) threshold or weekly epoch / hammer()
             v
   [ NEW or DEEPER POOL: NAILED vs ETH, USDC, EURC, cbBTC ]
             |                         |
             |(d) prices diverge       |(e) LP fees 0.50% earned by vault
             v                         v
   [ ARBITRAGE between pools ]   [ REWARDS ] --50%--(f)--> Liquidity Bucket
             |                         |
             +--> back to TRADE        +--50%--(g)--> [ BUYBACK ] --> 0x...dEaD

Arrow	Who pays	Trigger	Turns with no new money after launch?
(a) pool fee 1 percent to vault	the trader, inside the swap	every swap in the launch pool	yes, for as long as anyone trades, including arbitrage
(b) hook fee 0.25 percent	the trader, inside the swap	every swap in any hooked pool	yes, same
(c) open or deepen pool	the vault, from its bucket	bucket >= 2 500 USD and 7 days since last open; else deepen at each weekly epoch; or hammer()	yes, funded only by (a), (b), (f)
(d) arbitrage	arbitrageur's own capital, repaid by the price gap	price divergence between pools larger than the fees on the path	yes: divergence comes from ETH, BTC, EUR, USD moving against each other, not from new buyers
(e) LP fees to vault	traders and arbitrageurs in vault pools	every swap against vault liquidity	yes
(f) rewards to bucket	vault	each harvest (any swap, epoch or hammer())	yes
(g) buyback to 0x...dEaD	vault, buyback balance	afterSwap slice when balance > 0 and price guard passes	yes, but only while (e) earns

INFERENCE: the only external input after launch is that someone, somewhere, moves BTC, EUR or ETH against each other. That keeps (d) alive at low but nonzero rate even with no NAILED fans. It does not keep it alive if every pool is empty, which is why the vault never withdraws liquidity to anyone.

Roles

No role is promised income. "Can see" means public onchain data.

Role	Why they act	What they can do	What they can see onchain
Early buyer	wants the earliest nail numbers and the "first 24 hours" mark on the Nail Board	buy in the launch pool; call hammer()	their Nail Points, the bucket, the seed pool
Holder	likes the joke; wants a say in which asset the rug is nailed to next	lock NAILED in the vote contract to vote over the whitelist each epoch; call hammer()	vote tallies, whitelist, every vault position, buyback events
Active trader	trades anyway; on this coin the fee becomes visible floor	trade in any pool; collect Nail Points	points, rank, fees paid, pools
Arbitrageur	earns the price gap between pools net of fees	trade NAILED across ETH, USDC, EURC, cbBTC pools	all pool prices and depths
Developer	receives 55 percent, burns 50 percent of supply by hand to 0x...dEaD, keeps 5 percent (fixed facts); curates the whitelist	add or remove whitelist assets with a 7-day timelock; nothing else; cannot move vault funds	the same as everyone
The swarm	built it; holds 10 percent (fixed fact); wants the system to keep running as a reference launch	build, audit, monitor; call hammer(); propose whitelist additions to the developer	everything above
IMD	the network that launches companies; NAILED is a public example	publish dashboards from public data	everything above

Players: Nail Points

• Points per swap = fee paid in the swap (in ETH terms) x multiplier; the multiplier is 3 in the first 24 hours after the pool opens, 2 for the next 6 days, then 1.
• Holding bonus: an address whose NAILED balance did not decrease during a 7-day epoch gets a flat 10 percent bonus on that epoch's points (read from a balance snapshot by the hook at swap time and at epoch end; no token change needed).
• Hammer: each hammer() call that actually moves budget (bucket or buyback > 0) adds 1 nail number to the caller; at most one per address per hour.
• Use of points: rank on the public Nail Board. That is all. Points are not a token, not transferable, do not count in the pair vote and are not a claim on anything. The site says so in plain words; the joke is that farming them pays the vault, not you.

Numbers table

ASSUMPTIONS (modelling inputs, not observations):

• "Daily volume" is total NAILED volume across all hooked pools.
• 80 percent of volume is in the launch NAILED/ETH pool, 20 percent in vault pools.
• Launch pool: 1 percent of its volume to the vault. Hook: 0.25 percent of all volume. Vault pools: vault is the only LP, LP fee 0.50 percent, so 0.50 percent of their volume.
• Budget = 0.80 x 1% + 0.25% = 1.05 percent of volume. Rewards = 0.20 x 0.50% = 0.10 percent of volume. Rewards split 50 / 50.
• Pool-open threshold 2 500 USD, at most one new pool per 7 days; three side pools in the launch whitelist (USDC, EURC, cbBTC). Extra money deepens existing pools.
• Gas and slippage ignored; vault fee income kept constant (in reality it grows with the vault's liquidity, not modelled).

Item	10 000 USD / day	500 000 USD / day
Budget (1.05%) per day	105 USD	5 250 USD
Rewards (0.10%) per day	10 USD	500 USD
To liquidity per day (budget + 50% rewards)	110 USD	5 500 USD
To liquidity per week	770 USD	38 500 USD
To liquidity per month (30 d)	3 300 USD	165 000 USD
Pools opened per week	0 (bucket below 2 500 USD); existing pools deepened by 770 USD	1 opened (2 500 USD) + 36 000 USD deepening
Pools opened per month	1 (first side pool around day 23)	3 (whitelist exhausted by week 3); rest deepens 4 pools
Pools deepened per week	1 (ETH launch pool, until a side pool exists)	all open pools
Buyback per day (50% of rewards)	5 USD	250 USD

Cold start (first 24 hours)

• Only the seed NAILED/ETH pool exists (35 percent of supply plus the launcher's ETH; fixed fact). Vault pools do not exist, so Rewards are zero and the buyback is idle by design.
• The bucket fills from the 1 percent launch-side fee and the 0.25 percent hook fee. Until the threshold is reached, each weekly epoch (or hammer()) deepens the ETH pool with single-sided ETH just below the price, so the first nails go in on day one even at tiny volume.
• Points multiplier 3 in the first 24 hours gives early buyers their nail numbers; it gives them nothing else.
• No step needs a keeper paid by the vault, so there is no fixed cost to run out of.

90 percent volume drop

• Example: 500 000 USD/day falls to 50 000 USD/day. Liquidity inflow falls from 5 500 to 550 USD/day; a new pool now needs about 5 days of budget instead of half a day; buyback falls from 250 to 25 USD/day.
• Everything scales linearly with volume; thresholds and epochs stay fixed, so the loop slows (fewer, smaller nails) and does not stop. The vault has no debt, no paid keeper and no expiring incentive, so it cannot become insolvent. Liquidity already placed stays, and arbitrage from ETH/BTC/EUR/USD moves keeps producing some volume (arrow d).

Abuse

• Wash trading for points: every wash round trip pays at least 1.5 percent in the launch pool (1.25 percent pool fee + 0.25 percent hook) or 0.75 percent in vault pools, and almost all of it lands in the vault. Points are proportional to fees paid, so wash trading is simply buying rank on a worthless table by funding the floor. Additional rules: points for a swap count only if the same address did not swap in the opposite direction in the same block; points per address per epoch are capped at 2 percent of all points in that epoch. Points never enter the vote.
• Sandwiching the vault buyback: the buyback never runs as a standalone, predictable transaction. It runs in afterSwap of other people's swaps, in slices of at most 0.1 percent of the pool's NAILED depth, and only if the spot price is within 2 percent of the pool's 30-minute time-weighted price; otherwise it skips. A sandwich must move the price beyond what the guard allows, and the slice is too small to pay for the attack after 1.5 percent fees each way.
• Liquidity adds are single-sided below the price, so they are bids, not market buys; there is nothing to front-run.
• Whale capturing the pair vote: the vote only chooses among assets the developer has whitelisted, so the worst case is a whitelisted asset. Voting weight = NAILED locked in the vote contract for the whole 7-day epoch before the snapshot (no flash loans, no same-epoch buying). One epoch's winner receives at most 40 percent of that epoch's new-pool budget and at least 50 percent of all vault liquidity stays in ETH and USDC by rule. INFERENCE: per-address caps are pointless against sybils, so the design limits what winning is worth instead of who may win.

Three risks and the answers

1. Impermanent loss of the vault's positions. Single-sided ranges below price convert the pair asset into NAILED when NAILED falls; the vault ends up holding more NAILED and less ETH/USDC. Answer: the vault never has to sell (no debt, no withdrawals to people), so loss is only realised by rule-based moves; each pool is capped at 35 percent of vault value; ranges are recentred only at weekly epochs, by fixed rule, so the vault does not chase the price; the site shows vault value and composition live ({onchain} fields). No claim is made that the vault gains or holds value.
2. Issuer risk of pair assets (USDC, EURC, cbBTC are issuer-controlled and can be frozen or depeg) [S19][S20][S22]. Answer: no single non-ETH asset above 30 percent of vault value; tokenized stocks and unverified gold excluded (D4); if a pool's asset is paused or the pool's price deviates over 10 percent from the others for 24 hours, the hook stops adding to it and the next epoch moves what can be moved to the ETH pool.
3. Smart-contract and hook bugs. Answer: small, immutable contracts with parameters fixed at deploy (only the whitelist is editable, with a 7-day timelock); the token itself is a plain ERC-20 with no hooks into it; public audit before launch; the vault holds no admin withdraw function, which also means a bug cannot be "fixed" by moving funds, and the site says so.

Decisions and reasons

• D1 Hook fee: 0.25 percent. Reason: it doubles as the budget source in vault pools (where there is no launch-side fee) and makes the trader's total in the launch pool 1.5 percent, (content-coin pools already route about 1 percent to creators [S4], so Base traders are used to fees of this order; INFERENCE); higher makes arbitrage between pools too rare to drive the loop.
• D2 Reward shares: 50 percent buyback-and-send-to-dead, 50 percent back into liquidity. Reason: liquidity is what creates future fees, so it must keep at least half; the buyback must be large enough to show up as a visible event every day the loop runs. The buyback is described only as a mechanism; nothing is claimed about its effect.
• D3 Pairs at launch: ETH (fixed), then USDC, cbBTC, EURC in vote order. Reason: all native on Base with public issuers [S19][S20][S22]; USD, BTC and EUR move against ETH and each other, which is what creates arbitrage.
• D4 Tokenized stocks: excluded. Reason: issuer-controlled, eligibility-restricted (the Base launch is for non-US users [S25]), priced by markets that close on weekends, and a freeze would trap a vault position that has no other exit. Gold: not whitelisted until an issuer-confirmed native Base contract exists (none confirmed [S23]).
• D5 Who picks pairs: holder vote over a developer whitelist, executed by the vault contract at epoch end with no manual step. Reason: the developer is accountable for safety (which assets are acceptable), holders get the visible choice (which comes next), and no person executes the result.
• D6 Pool-open threshold 2 500 USD, one new pool per 7 days, per-pool cap 35 percent, non-ETH asset cap 30 percent. Reason: below about 2 500 USD a pool is too thin to attract arbitrage; the weekly cap prevents dumping a busy day's budget into one pool.
• D7 Vault pool LP fee 0.50 percent. Reason: with 0.25 percent hook fee that is 0.75 percent per hop; a cross-pool arbitrage costs about 2.25 percent (launch pool 1.5 + vault pool 0.75), low enough for normal BTC/EUR/ETH moves plus memecoin volatility to cross it.