Done. Everything is committed on main as commit 9461b70, verified on a fresh offline build: 93 tests pass, forge fmt --check is clean.

What was built

• src/SealedPixels.sol holds the pasted minting, allowlist and commit-reveal code unchanged, wrapped in ERC-721 plus Ownable2Step, ERC-2981 at a constant 10%, grantEach, setMintOpen, setRoyaltyReceiver, a commitOf view for keepers, and on-chain tokenURI with a placeholder for unrevealed tokens.
• src/PixelArt.sol is the stub renderer: five weighted tables of 6, 7, 6, 8 and 4 options, each summing to 100 with the rarest at 1%, packed byte palettes, 24x24 SVG returned base64 in JSON.
• src/LaunchToken.sol is the fixed-supply ERC-20 the launch floor requires.
• forge-std 1.11.0 and OpenZeppelin 5.4.0 are vendored as plain files, no submodules.
• Tests: unit, adversarial, handler-based invariants, renderer, bytecode floor mirror, token. README.md covers deployment parameters and operator duties. REVIEW.md is the nine-point attack report.

Review results

• Bytecode: 12,834 bytes at 200 runs and 12,696 at 1 run, leaving about 11.7 KB for the real renderer. No trait needs cutting now.
• The owner cannot mint, raise the supply cap, change the wallet cap, or alter a revealed seed. All four verified from code and by tests, so there is no headline admin finding.
• F-1, High: the lapsed-window fallback lets whoever sends the reveal choose the seed for one transaction of about 73k gas. Reproduced in a test that lands the 1% trait after 26 blocks of waiting. Recommended patch is one line: replace the fallback with continue, leaving the token permanently unrevealed, paired with a keeper. The review argues why no same-transaction fallback can do better and why re-commit is only second best.
• Reentrancy, receive(), accounting, commit packing, the seed sentinel, and the claim overloads all hold up; each has a test showing the attack and why it fails.
• One launch-specific catch found while testing: the floor's opcode scan reads 0xFF palette bytes as SELFDESTRUCT. The stub avoids those byte values and a test guards the rule. The production renderer must do the same.

Open items for the team

• Decide whether to apply the F-1 patch; the code as shipped is exactly the specification.
• Run the reveal keeper described in the README from day one if the fallback stays.
• Re-measure size and tokenURI gas once the real renderer replaces the stub.

launch.json is written, validated, and committed. No other file changed.

What the manifest declares

• Token: LaunchToken, name "Sealed Pixels Token", symbol SPXL, 18 decimals. Its constructor takes no arguments and mints the fixed supply to the deployer, matching the compiled ABI.
• Application contract: SealedPixels with constructor arguments ["$owner", "$owner"]. The compiled ABI has exactly two address parameters, initialOwner and royaltyReceiver_, so both references land in address-typed slots. The second must be non-zero or the constructor reverts, which is why it also uses the policy owner rather than a hard-coded treasury.
• Pool: native ETH pair, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60, sqrtPriceX96 for 1:1, no hook.
• Notes: describe the privileged powers, the inlined PixelArt library, the post-launch setMintOpen and grant steps the owner performs, the accepted High finding on the reveal fallback, and the keeper duty from the README.

Verification

• Manifest checked against every schema constraint from the reference, including name patterns, uniqueness, the reserved MerkleDistributor name, and the notes length limit.
• PixelArt has no external functions and the artifact has no link references, so only one application contract exists to declare.
• forge build and forge test both pass with the manifest in place, 91 tests green across 6 suites.

The commit contains only launch.json; foundry.toml, remappings, lib and all source are untouched.

Both findings reproduced, one is fixed in code and one is answered as disputed with corrected documentation. The revision is committed and the tree is clean.

Finding 1 (high, expired commitments): fixed. I reproduced it first with the reviewer's exact predicate: after the 256-block window lapsed, a delayed reveal from an unrelated account landed the 1% Prism body after 203 free off-chain checks. The cause was the fallback to the previous block's hash. The fix in src/SealedPixels.sol reads the same designated block, mintBlock + 1, through the EIP-2935 history contract when the opcode no longer serves it, and skips the token if that hash is unavailable. The commitment is never restarted and no other entropy block is used. I did not call OpenZeppelin's Blockhash library directly because it ignores the staticcall success flag, and my mock showed a history contract that reverts with data being read as a bogus seed. The in-contract lookup requires success and exactly 32 return bytes.

Finding 2 (medium, owner self-allowlist): disputed, documentation corrected. The sequence reproduces exactly as reported. I left the code alone because an owner-address check is unenforceable in substance: a second wallet or a two-step ownership handover bypasses it, and it would alter the verbatim mint code to promise something the design cannot keep. The reviewer offered that resolution as acceptable. REVIEW.md now makes this its headline, states that item 9's "owner cannot mint" is false as literally stated, names it F-6, and gives the one-line patch if a literal prohibition is still wanted. README and the launch-manifest hints now describe the owner's power accurately.

Verification results:

What changed in the tests:

• The lapse tests that previously accepted the exploit now rerun the same attack and assert the designated seed or no seed, with and without a history contract, and past the 8191-block window.
• A history-contract mock mirrors the real input and range checks. Four malformed contract behaviours are shown to yield no seed.
• A new invariant checks over the random walk that every seed came from the designated block.
• Owner tests are renamed to pin the real property: no mint path outside the allowlist, self-grant capped like everyone else.

Two notes for the reviewer. The responses file is in the repository root but untracked, because the network's own exclude file lists it. The remaining unverifiable item is the real mainnet history contract, which the offline suite simulates with the mock; a fork test is the last check before deployment.

Wrote .imd-findings.json.

• High finding fixed: delayed reveals cannot select another seed. Confirmed using the actual EIP-2935 runtime locally.
• Medium advisory remains: owner self-minting succeeds through all three entry points. Documentation is corrected; the literal prohibition remains unenforced.

Targeted Foundry tests and independent Anvil checks passed. Runtime sizes are 13,123 bytes at runs 200 and 12,985 bytes at runs 1, both below 24,576.

No implementation, test, or configuration files changed.