Implemented LaunchToken (KUDO) and KudosEpochs, with vendored dependencies, ABI exports, and documented deployment parameters and operational assumptions.

Verified with Solidity 0.8.26:

• forge build passes offline.
• All 35 tests pass, including 8,192 invariant calls.
• forge fmt --check passes.
• ABI exports match compiled contracts.

Independent review, manifest generation, and deployment remain separate stage responsibilities.

I wrote launch.json, and it's the only file I added or changed. forge build succeeds and forge test passes all 36 tests: the 35 existing ones plus one scratch check of my own.

What's in the manifest

• Kind: "evm_project".
• Token: contract LaunchToken, name Kudos, symbol KUDO, decimals 18. These match what src/LaunchToken.sol sets. The token takes no constructor arguments.
• Contracts: one entry, KudosEpochs, with constructor arguments ["$token"]. That fills its single address token_ parameter. It has no owner parameter, so there's no $owner, no privileged wallet and no initialization calls.
• Pool: paired with native Sepolia ETH (the zero address), fee 3000, tickSpacing 60, initialPrice "79228162514264337593543950336", no hook.
• Notes: 1,103 characters (limit 4,000) describing only the two contracts in the tree. There are no supply, allocation or owner fields; those come from the launch policy.

How I checked it

• A Python script checked the manifest against the schema's structural rules: allowed fields, address format, price below 2^256, notes length, unique names, and MerkleDistributor not used.
• A scratch Foundry test built from the manifest's values deploys LaunchToken and then KudosEpochs with the token address. It confirms the name, symbol, decimals and full supply of 10^27 (1 billion tokens with 18 decimals). It also confirms token() returns the launch token and that KudosEpochs holds no KUDO at deploy.
• My first version of that test read launch.json directly, but Foundry's file-read permissions blocked it. I couldn't change them without editing foundry.toml, which is off-limits, so I generated the test from the manifest instead.

No substantiated defects found. Wrote {"findings":[]} to .imd-findings.json.

Independent local EVM checks confirmed:

• Excess kudos: One sender’s give(B,2,0) → give(C,1,0) → give(B,2,0) exhausts its allowance; another give reverts. At exactly deployTimestamp + 604800, counts 3 → 2 → 1 in one block produce success, success, revert.
• Overflow and mis-crediting: give(B,5,floor((2²⁵⁶−1)/5)+1) reverts with Panic(0x11) without changing credits or allowance. Paying gives of (B,3,2) and (C,2,1) credit exactly 6 and 2 minor units. Withdrawals preserve other recipients’ funds; a second withdrawal reverts.
• Withdrawal reentrancy: With attacker credit 6 and another recipient’s credit 4, a malicious-token callback attempts withdraw() and give(C,1,0). Both revert with ReentrancyGuardReentrantCall. The attacker receives only 6; the other 4 remain backed. Production KUDO has no transfer callbacks.

launch.json correctly supplies ["$token"] to KudosEpochs(address token_). LaunchToken() takes no arguments. Neither constructor grants an owner, admin, or upgrade role. Both ABI exports match compilation.

Accounting equality holds for give/withdraw flows; documented direct donations create uncredited surplus. Existing repository files were unchanged.

Implemented the frontend, verified deployment manifest and 563 KB static export.

Build, typecheck, 16 browser tests, ABI/hash validation and live Sepolia reads passed. Evidence and design documentation are in docs/; no real transactions were broadcast.

Commit blocked: .git is read-only. All deliverables are saved within the allowed paths.