The deliverable is complete and verified locally.

What was built

• src/MADToken.sol: contract MADToken, a fixed-supply ERC-20 on OpenZeppelin v5.4.0. Name "Mutually Assured Destruction", symbol "MAD", 18 decimals. The constructor takes no arguments, makes no external calls, and mints the full supply once to the deployer. There is no owner, mint, burn, pause, blacklist, fee, proxy, delegatecall or selfdestruct.
• test/MADToken.t.sol: 29 tests covering metadata, supply, EOA and contract deployers, transfer and allowance success and failure paths with exact ERC-6093 errors, event emission, rejection of plausible admin selectors from both a stranger and the deployer, ETH rejection, and four fuzz tests for supply conservation.
• foundry.toml pins solc 0.8.26 with bytecode_hash = "none", optimizer on, ffi off and empty filesystem permissions. remappings.txt points at the vendored libraries.
• lib/forge-std (1.17.0) and lib/openzeppelin-contracts (v5.4.0) are vendored as plain files with their .git directories removed, so the offline verifier builds without network and no submodule exists.
• README.md documents assumptions, deployment parameters, the empty "After launch" section, operational responsibilities and security notes.

Checks run

Check	Result
forge build (clean)	success
forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed	29 passed, 0 failed
forge fmt --check	clean
Scratch replica of the floor's opcode scan and CREATE2 deploy	2 passed

Notes for the manifest step

Constructor arguments are empty and the supply in minor units is 1000000000000000000000000000. No launch.json was written. The token exempts no addresses because no transfer path is taxed, so the launch flows move exactly what they say.

I found no defects in the permissions area, so .imd-findings.json has an empty findings list plus a coverage record. I read the code and didn't run any tests.

src/MADToken.sol is an unmodified OpenZeppelin ERC20. Its constructor mints the fixed supply of 1,000,000,000 × 10¹⁸ to msg.sender once, and nothing can reach _mint after that.

On the three guides:

• Access control: the token has no owner, role, pause, blacklist, freeze or seize function, so there is nothing to bypass.
• Trust gap: after deployment nobody holds any power over the token or over anyone's balance.
• Asymmetry: there are no fees or burns and no exemptions, so every transfer moves exactly the amount asked. That means the launch flows (distributor share, pool seed, remainder) arrive in full.

Coverage rows:

Entry point	Verdict	Why
approve(address,uint256)	holds	Only sets the caller's own allowance.
transfer(address,uint256)	holds	Moves the exact amount; no fee, burn or privileged path.
transferFrom(address,address,uint256)	holds	Spends the allowance before moving funds; nobody can skip that.
Fixed supply, no privileged roles (invariant)	holds	Supply is minted once in the constructor and can't grow.

The static-analysis leads didn't lead anywhere. The one aderyn note, a large numeric literal at line 25, is just the supply constant and isn't a defect. Slither reported nothing.

I found no defects I could reproduce with a concrete failing input in MADToken. .imd-findings.json has an empty findings list and a coverage row for each of the three listed entry points, all marked holds. No tracked file changed.

What the code is: src/MADToken.sol is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20. Its only custom code is the constant name, symbol and decimals and a constructor that mints 1,000,000,000 × 10^18 (1e27) once to msg.sender. I downloaded upstream OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 and diffed the vendored ERC20.sol, IERC20.sol, IERC20Metadata.sol, Context.sol and draft-IERC6093.sol against it: all five are byte-identical. All three entry points run on that standard code.

Coverage against the three guides:

• Execution Trace: I traced each entry point from the call to its final state change.
  • transfer and transferFrom reject the zero address, revert when the balance is short, and change the sender's and receiver's balances together.
  • transferFrom spends the allowance before moving tokens, in the same call. An unlimited (type(uint256).max) allowance is intentionally never reduced, which is standard OpenZeppelin behaviour.
  • There is no fee, hook, external call or setter, so nothing can be read stale and no settings can change partway through.
  • Any allowance left over after transferFrom is only what the owner explicitly granted.
• Periphery: the inherited base contract and error interfaces match upstream exactly. They have no assembly, loops or hidden storage writes.
• First Principles: I checked the edge cases: zero amount, the whole balance, sending to yourself (balance unchanged), and an unlimited allowance. Nothing can mint after the constructor, so the supply stays at 1e27, and the sum of all balances always equals the total supply.
• Launch flows: the token has no transfer tax or burn. Transfers from the factory to the distributor, distributor claims, the pool seed and swaps therefore move exactly the stated amounts. There are no owner, pause, blacklist or mint powers, and the token contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.

Static-analysis leads: Aderyn flagged a "large numeric literal" at src/MADToken.sol:25. That is TOTAL_SUPPLY written with digit separators, and the value is correct, so it is not a defect. Slither reported nothing.

Not covered:

• I didn't run the protected launch test (Token.protected.t.sol). It needs the launch environment variables and src/LaunchLiquidity.sol, src/PoolInitializationGuard.sol and src/HookFlags.sol, none of which are in this tree.
• I didn't report the well-known ERC-20 behaviours as findings: an approval change can be front-run, and tokens sent to the token's own address are stuck. They are inherent to a plain ERC-20 and not defects against this specification.

The manifest is written and verified. Only launch.json was added; nothing else in the tree changed.

What launch.json contains

• Token entry for MADToken, the only contract in the accepted tree. Its constructor takes no parameters, so constructorArgs is an empty list, and totalSupply is the 1e27 minor units it mints to msg.sender.
• Empty contracts list, since the tree has no application contracts.
• Pool block exactly as the launch reference gives it: FWA as paired currency, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one initialPrice.
• Economics object copied verbatim from the job.
• Notes under 1000 characters describing the token's fixed supply, lack of privileged functions, and why it needs no launch-address exemptions.

Checks run

• A JSON check confirmed only schema keys are present, the supply string matches, and economics equals the job's object.
• The build compiled cleanly with solc 0.8.26.
• All 29 existing tests passed with the verifier's fuzz seed.
• Git status shows launch.json as the only new file, with no modifications elsewhere.

The math review of the MAD token is complete with no defects found. The findings file is written and the working tree is unchanged apart from gitignored build output.

What I checked, against the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap guides:

• Math Precision. The token has one arithmetic expression, the supply constant at src/MADToken.sol:25. It evaluates at compile time to exactly 1e27, fits comfortably in uint256, and matches the required supply and the README's manifest value. There is no division, scaling, fee, decimals conversion or downcast anywhere. The aderyn "large numeric literal" lead is a style note on that same line and not a defect.
• Boundary. The token makes no external calls, has no payable function, no receive or fallback, and decodes no bytes. The only sentinel branches are OpenZeppelin's zero-address checks, and both sides of each were walked. Scratch tests confirmed that transfers of max uint, balance plus one, whole balance, zero, self-transfer, short calldata and dirty address words all behave as the standard specifies.
• Numerical Gap. The balance-sum invariant holds exactly because no path rounds. The supply is divisible by 10,000, so the launch's 10/80/10 split has no remainder. Allowance edge cases at max and max minus one behave correctly.
• Dependency integrity. The vendored OpenZeppelin ERC20 and its four imports are byte-identical to upstream v5.4.0, so the unchecked blocks carry upstream's proven bounds.

Coverage record. All three entry points, approve, transfer and transferFrom, are marked holds, plus four rows for the supply invariant, the balance-sum invariant, the boundary enumeration and the aderyn lead.

Nothing in the three guides reaches this code in a way that fails. I did not look beyond the token and its vendored dependencies, since the project contains nothing else.

The review is complete and .imd-findings.json is written with one info finding and seven coverage rows. No source files were changed. The only files I created are the findings file and a scratch test under test/scratch/, which is not kept.

Outcome: no defects of medium or higher severity in the Economic Security, Invariant and Flow Gap areas. The token is OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 with a single constructor mint and nothing else.

What I verified, with evidence:

• Dependency integrity. The five vendored files in the token's import graph are byte-identical to a fresh clone of the upstream v5.4.0 tag. Other vendored OpenZeppelin files differ only in formatting and are not imported.
• Conservation invariant. A Foundry invariant run of 128,000 random transfer, approve and transferFrom calls across seven actors, including the token address and the factory, kept the balance sum equal to the fixed supply and the supply unchanged.
• Launch flows. The 10/80/10 split partitions the supply with zero dust. Factory to distributor, seed, remainder, claims to many claimants, and a pool buy and sell-back all moved exactly the stated amounts. No exemption list is needed because there is no fee, burn or gate.
• Privilege and bytecode floor. The ABI has 13 functions, none of which reach mint or burn. No receive or fallback. A reachable-opcode scan of the compiled runtime found no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.
• Static analysis leads. Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's "large numeric literal" is style only; the constant evaluates to exactly 1e27.

The one finding is the standard ERC-20 approve front-running race, reported at info. OpenZeppelin v5 dropped increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance, so a holder lowering an allowance can be front-run. It is inherent to the standard, does not affect any launch flow, and needs no design change.

Two notes outside findings, since neither has a failing state today:

• decimals() is not overridden to return the TOKEN_DECIMALS constant, while TOTAL_SUPPLY is derived from that constant. Both are 18 now, so they agree. A future edit to the constant would silently desync the supply from the reported decimals.
• The README names Ethereum chain id 1 and a pair token address I could not verify from this machine. That is the manifest step's concern, not the token's.

I added invariant tests and edge-case tests for MADToken, and all 48 tests pass under forge build and forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed. I found no defects, so I didn't write .imd-findings.json.

The token is a thin wrapper around OpenZeppelin's standard ERC-20. Its whole 1,000,000,000 MAD supply (18 decimals) is minted to the deployer in the constructor. It has no owner, no fees and no admin functions. I left the earlier contributor's test/MADToken.t.sol (29 tests) untouched and added two files.

test/MADToken.invariant.t.sol: random call sequences over five accounts, the deployer among them, run 256 times at 64 calls each.

• What gets called: transfers (mostly within balance, sometimes one over, sometimes any amount), approvals (including unlimited ones), and spending an allowance. It also includes calls to the zero address and attempts at common admin functions such as mint, burn, seize and pause.
• Failure paths: every call that should fail is checked for the exact OpenZeppelin error, and for leaving all balances and allowances unchanged. A test call that reverts unexpectedly fails the run.
• What must hold after every sequence:
  • the supply stays at 1,000,000,000 MAD;
  • the five balances add up to the supply, and the zero address, the token and the test contract hold none;
  • each balance and allowance matches a record kept by the test from the ERC-20 rules;
  • the token holds no ETH;
  • name, symbol and decimals don't change.
• It does catch errors: I deliberately broke one of its expected errors in a throwaway copy, and every invariant failed.

test/MADToken.edges.t.sol (18 tests):

• Launch-style deployment: the token is deployed with CREATE2 to its predicted address. The 10%/80%/10% split then arrives exact, all in one transaction. Reusing the same salt fails.
• Allowance failure paths:
  • sending to the zero address with an allowance fails and leaves the allowance intact;
  • an owner needs an allowance even to spend from their own account;
  • a failed spend changes nothing, and a revoked allowance blocks the spender;
  • spending the entire supply from an exact allowance leaves it at zero.
• Amount limits: sending zero needs no allowance, and sending one more than the supply or the maximum possible amount fails.
• Zero address as caller: it can't send or approve.
• Fuzz tests: approvals read back exactly, an unlimited allowance is never reduced, sending to yourself changes nothing, and sending tokens there and back restores the balances.

One thing to know, though it isn't a defect: tokens sent to the token contract's own address can never be recovered. A test pins this down. The README already lists it as the holder's responsibility.

The invariant suite takes about 96 seconds on this machine. Both new files are uncommitted in test/, and nothing was installed.

The review is complete and written to .imd-findings.json. The tree is otherwise unchanged.

Outcome: no defects. The token is a 34-line wrapper over OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 with a zero-argument constructor that mints 1e27 minor units to the deployer. The only finding kept is the one specialist note, at info.

What I verified

• The vendored ERC20 and Context sources match the genuine OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 logic. There is no custom transfer, mint, burn, pause, blacklist or owner path, and the compiled ABI exposes only the standard ERC-20 functions plus four constants.
• The constant on line 25 evaluates to exactly the manifest's totalSupply. Decimals are 18 in both places.
• Creation code is 3382 bytes and runtime 2196 bytes, far under the CREATE2 limits. A reachable-opcode scan of the runtime found no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.
• launch.json uses only schema keys, lowercase addresses, an 8-character contract name and an empty constructorArgs that matches the parameterless constructor.
• The project's 48 unit, fuzz and invariant tests all pass.

Specialist findings. The audit_economics approve-race note reproduces exactly as stated. A trader who front-runs a lowering approve ends with 150 ether instead of 100. That is inherent EIP-20 behaviour, untouched by this code, and no launch flow relies on a lowered allowance, so it stays at info with no change required. The other three specialists and the test writer reported nothing, which matches my own read.

Coverage. All three entry points are answered: approve carries the info note, transfer and transferFrom hold. I also recorded rows for the constructor, factory deployability, the manifest schema and the aderyn large-literal lead, which is a verified compile-time constant.

One documentation nit outside the findings: the README says the repository contains no launch.json, but one is present. It is harmless and not a code defect.